

*National Security:
Evolution or Revolution?*



April 9, 2003



An address by
Albert Carnesale
Chancellor



The following is a slightly abridged text of Chancellor Albert Carnesale's address: "National Security: Evolution or Revolution?" This lecture was delivered during the April 9, 2003, session of the Honors Collegium 155 undergraduate class, "The US and the World post-9/11." This unusual 10-part series, which was open to the broader community in addition to being offered as a credit course for students, was sponsored by the Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA. The series was hosted by Geoffrey Garrett, vice provost and dean of the UCLA International Institute and director of the Burkle Center, and Steven Spiegel, associate director of the Burkle Center. The series featured distinguished experts from throughout Southern California, discussing the most pressing issues confronting America and the world today.

In addition to serving as Chancellor of UCLA, Albert Carnesale is a well-known authority on national security policy and arms control. He holds professorial appointments in the School of Public Policy and Social Research and in the Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science, and teaches an undergraduate course on international affairs and security. He has served as a consultant to the Executive Office of the President; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Carnesale also participated in the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, 1970-72) and led the U.S. delegation to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1978-80), a 66-nation study of the relationship between civilian nuclear power and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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I want to thank Geoff Garrett and Steve Spiegel for inviting me here. This course provides a valuable service to students and to the community. It represents one of the ways in which the University is responding to the new post-9/11 world. I think that it is very valuable to have these lectures open to the community as well as to students, while also being grounded in academic rigor – with outside readings and further discussions for the students – this is a valuable aspect of the course.

I want to reiterate what Geoff said in his introduction: I speak today as a professor, not as Chancellor. There are times when I speak for the University. This is not one of them. This time I speak only for myself.

National Security - Evolution or Revolution?

Since we are going to talk about changes in national security, let me begin by talking about what the United States' tradition has been in the past. To some extent, this part of my talk will echo talks that I have given before, because the tradition hasn't changed. So first I will summarize the history, and then we will turn to what has changed.

First of all, American foreign policy traditionally has focused on national security. There are other aspects of foreign policy,

but U.S. foreign policy generally has been built around national security. Our general pattern has been to identify one or two foreign powers who were considered to be principal adversaries. From the Revolutionary War to the late 1800s, you will find that Great Britain was that principal adversary. As you would expect, other adversaries arose from time to time.

In the first half of the 20th century, America's principal adversaries were Germany and Japan. We were concerned about Germany in Europe, in the Atlantic and to some extent in Latin America, and we were concerned about Japan in Asia and in the Pacific. And, of course, we engaged both Germany and Japan in World War II.

In the second half of the 20th century, our principal adversary was the Soviet Union. We considered our secondary adversary to be the People's Republic of China, largely because of its association with the Soviet Union. This was called the Cold War era.

In 1989, five years after this year's freshmen were born, the Berlin Wall fell. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed; the Cold War was over. And then for some time to come, there was the period often described as the "post-Cold War era." This era was defined not by what it was, but by what it wasn't. It was no longer the Cold War. It wasn't clear what it was because, suddenly, we had no principal adversary. Without a principal adversary, which always had been the mechanism for defining U.S. foreign policy, we had no organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy.

If you look back at the decade or more since the collapse of the Soviet Union, you won't find a simple pattern that describes which conflicts the United States chose to get into and which ones we chose not to get into. If you look back at the Cold War period, however, it is easy to figure out what we did and why. The U.S. might have been viewed by some as misguided, but it

was pretty clear what we were trying to do, and that was to contain the Soviet Union by any means possible.

Then came the attack of September 11, 2001. Is this a new era? Is it something more readily definable than the post-Cold War era? Do these times fit well into our traditional way of thinking about U.S. foreign policy? Are terrorists now the principal adversary? Is Osama bin Laden our principal adversary? Or perhaps, more recently, Saddam Hussein? Terrorists are the adversaries who came to mind immediately after 9/11. Could the defeat of terrorism now be the organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy?

Always Ask: What Are We Trying to Do?

Let me talk a little about America's national interests. Why talk about national interests? It might seem like a rather abstract subject. But foreign policy and defense policy surely should be based upon our national interests. Let me start with the question: What are we trying to do?

This is not an original question, but it's always insightful. The best form of it that I have seen is from the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who died in 1900. Nietzsche said: "Forgetting our objectives is the most frequent act of stupidity." To avoid that mistake, it is useful constantly to ask: What are we trying to do?

Our national interests reflect our priorities, at least to some extent. What do we think is most important? Very often the most important national interests are labeled "vital interests." Vital; indispensable; essential to our lives. These are interests for which we would be willing to send young men and women to die in order to defend. That is what we should mean by vital interests.

National interests, interestingly enough, wind up being connected to capabilities. What abilities do we have to protect

these interests? Powerful nations think that they have many more interests, including vital interests, than do weak nations.

Take the decision to go to war in Iraq. Whatever you think the reasons might have been – and we will talk about this more later – would not the reasons have been the same for Canada? Or for Belgium? Why didn't those countries decide that it was important for them to go and free the people of Iraq? Mostly, it's because they couldn't. They didn't have the ability to do so. It was not one of their options. They just don't have the military capability to do that. We do. Powerful countries tend to extend their perceived interests simply because they believe they have the ability to defend those interests.

It is rare that a nation declares as a vital interest something that it cannot defend. But there arises the question: Does the mere fact that we can do it mean that we should do it?

Survival, Security, and Satisfaction

I have a fairly simple framework for thinking about national interests. I divide them into three categories: survival, security, and satisfaction, in that order. And it is important to think of them in that order.

To ensure our survival, we must protect our lives and our way of life against direct attacks on our homeland. What is it that threatens our lives and our way of life? Mostly, weapons of mass destruction: principally, nuclear weapons, perhaps biological weapons. Generally speaking, not chemical weapons. It is hard, but not impossible, to imagine killing large numbers of people with chemical weapons in the United States. Unfortunately, however, it is easy to see how large numbers of people could be killed by nuclear weapons. And it's only slightly more difficult to do this with biological weapons. These are survival issues.

To ensure our security, we need to avoid and dampen conflicts that might escalate and threaten our survival. That is why we have such strong interests in preventing the rise of a hostile major power in Europe or Asia. We have seen before that the rise of a hostile major power in these regions could threaten our survival. For our security, we also consider it important to preserve the viability of global systems. We consider it important to preserve the environment, financial markets, and energy markets, because what happens elsewhere could affect our survival and our way of life, and because crises in these arenas could escalate into conflict that could threaten our survival. These are security issues.

Finally, there is satisfaction, by which I mean extending our values and our way of life to others who choose to share them. This does not mean stuffing them down other people's throats, but rather, extending such things to others who might want them. We have commitments to others that we must honor, whether they be to the NATO countries, or to Japan, or to Taiwan, or to South Korea, or elsewhere. And we have an interest in spreading democracy and human rights.

But I'm not going to talk about all of these today. What I am going to talk about today are our vital interests – those related to our survival.

So let me begin with the question: Who most threatens the survival of the United States? Not very long ago, everybody would answer that question immediately with the "Soviet Union" and, perhaps also with, "the People's Republic of China." And, by the way, those countries still pose a threat. If the people in Russia decided today to push a button, within hours they could have thousands of nuclear weapons going off in the United States, and the United States would be gone as a viable society. But I believe that if you ask today who threatens our survival now, the response would relate to international

terrorism and to the “Axis of Evil.” The “Axis of Evil,” as identified by President Bush, is Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

How do terrorists or the “Axis of Evil” threaten the survival of the United States? Do any of these adversaries have weapons of mass destruction? This is an important question to ask because it is largely through weapons of mass destruction that threats to our survival are posed. These adversaries do not pose the kind of threat – in terms of numbers of weapons – that Russia, or even China, pose. China doesn’t have that many nuclear weapons – 20 or 30 – but one of those could ruin your whole day. An attack on 20 major cities surely changes our lives. Nobody is talking about terrorists having that many weapons, or even, more generally speaking, about their having any nuclear weapons at this time.

At this time, we are concerned with smaller attacks – smaller, credible attacks. Such attacks can do substantial damage, but nothing like the damage that we planned for during the Cold War. We worry also about not just damage, but about the disruption of our lives. Stop and think for a moment about the anthrax scare that occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks and about what it meant for our society. Consider how frightened people were and how their concerns changed the way in which they lived. How many people died from anthrax? I think the latest number is six.

Or think, as horrible as it was, of the Twin Towers. Almost 3,000 people died in New York from that attack. Does anybody here have a feeling for how many lives we lose each week on the highways? How long does it take to get to 3,000? Maybe a month-and-a-half of deaths on the highways. But attacks like those on the World Trade Center are the ones that remain vivid in our minds. They are closer, more real to us. They feel more personal. Whereas the Cold War image of a massive Soviet attack with nuclear weapons was literally unthinkable, and fortunately so.

We Are Fighting Four Wars

Let’s talk about America’s new adversaries. These adversaries are no longer defined as the Soviet Union or Russia and China. Now they are international terrorism and the “Axis of Evil.” In some ways we are fighting not one war, the Cold War, but four wars: a war against terrorists; a war against Iraq, literally; a war against North Korea; and a war against Iran. Those are the adversaries. Remember that the Cold War was not a military war either. We never did fight the Soviet Union; rather we threatened each other.

Amy Sandler is my teaching assistant in the courses that I have been teaching on national security. Since she knows that I love phrases like “survival, security, and satisfaction,” she devised names for these wars. If I thought they were bad, I wouldn’t use them. I thought that they were pretty good, and I might have taken credit for them myself, but she is probably here some place so I don’t dare do that.

In Amy’s words, the war against terrorism is a “War of Shadows”; the war against Iraq is a “War of Soldiers”; the war against North Korea is a “War of Speeches”; and the war against Iran is a “War of Silence.” Four more S’s. Pretty good, don’t you think?

Consider first the war of shadows. It’s the war against terrorism. What do we mean by “terrorism”? In a sense it is not proper to call it a “war on terrorism”; it’s a “war on terrorists.” Terrorism is a phenomenon. Terrorists are the people who perpetrate it. And that might seem like a small technicality, but those of you who are doing the readings and who read the article by Brian Jenkins will see that the distinction is actually helpful. But a “war on terrorism” is good shorthand.

Again, what do we mean by terrorism? It may be hard to define; but, like pornography, you know it when you see it. Right? That was the Supreme Court’s wisdom. But not

everybody sees the same thing. And terrorism does have a political dimension. There is the phrase, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This is not always true; one must be careful not to imply moral equivalency here. But there is something to it. It is certainly true that the terrorists are usually the ones who are militarily weaker. And so they don't play the game the same way as the stronger side would. That is not to be confused with "Their cause is always right," nor with "Their cause is always wrong."

What are the defining characteristics of terrorism? First, it invariably involves premeditated violence. Second, it is carried out by sub-national groups. In other words, if a nation's army or air force carries out terrible violent acts, we don't consider that terrorism. By terrorism we mean non-state actors, sub-national groups. Terrorism is aimed at civilians, or at least at noncombatants. It may be directed at people in the military, but if they are working in an office building some place, that generally is still considered terrorism. And finally, terrorism is done to change the existing political order. It's not a random act of violence. These are the characteristics of terrorism.

And who are terrorists? Well, as I say, usually they are non-state actors, almost by definition. They can have different motivations. They could be nationalists, they could be monarchists. They could be left-wing, they could be right-wing. They could be motivated by religion. But they are trying to change the existing political order. A prominent example: al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

What was the objective of the 9/11 attack? We have pretty good evidence that it was carried out by al Qaeda, so let's use them in our assumption. What were the terrorists trying to do?

My answer is, I don't know. But let's talk about some possibilities. They never declared quite clearly what their objective was. They might have been – this is a popular theory –

trying to provoke a U.S. reaction that would be so severe that it would unite the Muslim world into perceiving this as a war by the United States and the West against Islam. They simply might have been trying to demonstrate the vulnerability of the United States, the great Satan in their eyes. They might have been trying to stimulate change in Arab countries, particularly those that have what we would call moderate governments, but that others would call pro-U.S. governments. They might have been trying to affect the outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute. They might have been trying to achieve all of these objectives, or some combination of them. Or others.

Was the 9/11 attack successful? From the terrorists' point of view, I don't know, because I would have to know what their objective was. But it does appear that the attack demonstrated U.S. vulnerability. The death of 3,000 people, approximately the number of fatalities suffered on September 11, in some ways, would not qualify as mass destruction, but it's surely bad enough. Three thousand innocent people lost their lives. The attack certainly did provoke U.S. reaction, in Afghanistan and to a substantial degree in Iraq. Remember that the Bush Administration's initial justification for a move against Iraq was a supposed connection to 9/11. The attack certainly has stimulated U.S. support, particularly President Bush's support, for resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute – or I should say, in this context, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute – in a way that is probably more favorable for the Palestinians than it would have been before. So in those ways, the attack does appear to have been successful.

What are some key elements of this war against terrorism, this war of shadows? Remember the Cold War strategy. The Cold War strategy was pretty simple: deterrence. In order to ensure that the Soviet Union neither invaded Western Europe nor attacked the United States, we posed the threat of massive

retaliation in one way or another. The Soviets knew that no matter what they did, we had an arsenal, a nuclear arsenal, that could devastate their military forces, and if we chose to do so, could devastate their homeland. Unfortunately, or fortunately, they could do the same to us – so it was a stalemate. That strategy of deterrence doesn't seem to be applicable against terrorists. What homeland is it that we would destroy in retaliation? What military forces would we attack?

Against al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, our initial strategy was to deal with Osama bin Laden first. Osama was: "Wanted: Dead or Alive." We personalized it. But Osama bin Laden is now in the shadows. Against al Qaeda we have attacked what could be attacked – their leadership, their financial sources, their training bases, their cells, and their state sponsors. That's what the attack on Afghanistan was all about. It was about their support for al Qaeda.

The U.S. hasn't found any link between Iraq and al Qaeda. To students of that part of the world, this comes as no surprise. Iraq has a secular government in a Muslim country. If there is anything al Qaeda despises as much as it despises the United States, it's a secular government in a Muslim country.

Another element in our war against terrorism is the way we organize ourselves. We organized ourselves for the Cold War with the National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the American government. Many of you may not realize it, but before 1947 there was no Department of Defense; there was no Central Intelligence Agency; and there was no National Security Council. Now we have formed the Department of Homeland Security. Its primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks and, in events where there are terrorist attacks, to reduce our vulnerability to them. On March 1, most of the Department took shape. It is to have 169,000 employees, making it the third-largest department in government, and it is to have an annual budget of \$37 billion.

The Department of Homeland Security is divided into five areas. One is Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) – a big part of which is intelligence analysis, assembling all of the intelligence that deals with terrorism and trying to integrate it. The new department doesn't gather intelligence; that remains the responsibility of the CIA and other agencies. The second area of responsibility is Border and Transportation Security (BTS), which is self-explanatory. Third: Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), which reflects the fact that the Department now worries about earthquakes and other natural and man-made disasters. Fourth is Science and Technology (S & T): How do we use science and technology to secure our homeland? And fifth is Management. Management will be difficult. It will require not only coordination among federal agencies, but also with state governments, local governments, the private sector, and the like.

Parts of this new Department of Homeland Security were taken from almost every other department in government. There is one very notable exception that was essentially untouched: the Department of Defense.

What are the major challenges faced by the Department of Homeland Security? One is bureaucracy. It's going to take time for this behemoth to be able to act nimbly. This is the biggest reorganization in the U.S. government, since 1947. A \$37 billion budget represents a lot of money and wields a lot of influence. At the same time, it is roughly one-tenth of what the Department of Defense will spend this year. And the Department of Homeland Security is positioned at the intersection of domestic and foreign policy. These officials, probably more than any other group, will have to deal with the painful trade-offs between security and civil liberties.

Let me turn now to the war with Iraq, the war of soldiers. What were the U.S. objectives for this war? Let me give you a

list. These objectives are not my list, they are those of the Administration.

The first objective: the war with Iraq is an important part of the war on terrorism. The U.S. was looking for Iraqi connections to al Qaeda. The Administration also was concerned that Iraq might produce weapons of mass destruction and provide them to terrorists. I don't think that we have found evidence of either of those things, but if that had been the case, it would have been pretty frightening.

Second, interestingly enough, and this is hard to appreciate in hindsight, one of our principal objectives was to support the United Nations. Remember, there were some 16 United Nations resolutions with which we believed that Iraq had not fully complied. And to preserve the credibility of the United Nations, it was important to enforce the UN resolutions.

A third stated objective was regime change. Saddam Hussein is unquestionably an evil tyrant. The idea was to eliminate that regime and liberate the Iraqi people.

A fourth, more recent rationale, was to democratize the Middle East. The Administration asserted that democratizing Iraq would have a domino effect – what could be called “democracy dominos.” Some of you may remember the domino effect from the Vietnam War or actually even before, from when it was called French Indochina. In 1954, President Eisenhower referred to the problem of how one country after another – first it would be Indochina, then this one, then that one – would fall to Communism like a stack of dominos. Well, today we seek a reverse domino effect. The belief is that we are going to have one democracy in Iraq, and then others are going to arise all around the Middle East, and then we will have stability in that region.

The fifth objective is one that's never mentioned by the Administration, but it's got to be in the calculation someplace, and that is oil. It's one of the things that makes this region so

important to us and why we want stability there. Iraq is rich in world energy supplies, which are very important to international trade and to our way of life.

Consider Saddam's dilemma when he was trying to figure out how he was going to deal with UN resolutions calling for disarmament.

Let's take two cases. In case one, assume that Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction, or that he got rid of them all. And then we'll consider case two, where he has weapons of mass destruction and has kept them.

In case one, how could Saddam prove that he has no weapons of mass destruction? He can't possibly do so, because that would require proving a negative. If we had inspectors running all around Iraq, all the time, a million of them, the best that they could ever tell us is that they haven't found any weapons yet. It's not possible to prove that there are no weapons. If Saddam believes that he's got to prove to the United States that he doesn't have any weapons of mass destruction or else the Americans are going to attack, his case is hopeless.

In case two, we assume that Saddam does have weapons of mass destruction. Why would he even think of getting rid of them? The reason would be to try to influence the international community to dissuade the United States from attacking. It's a tricky business, though. Because if Saddam doesn't have any of these weapons, or he gets rid of them in an effort to convince the international community that he doesn't have any, and the U.S. decides to attack anyway, then he has no weapons of mass destruction with which to deter us or to use against us. It's a tough situation for Saddam, no matter how you think of it.

Our information to date indicates that he did not have substantial stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. We may find that he has some chemical weapons, but that remains to be seen.

What about U.S. options at this stage? First of all, at this time it appears that the military phase of the war is virtually over, and that it was highly successful for the United States and Great Britain. No weapons of mass destruction were used.

What's next? What's next will be the hard part, politically. And that is the nature of governance in Iraq and the ways in which it will be perceived by the international community. Initially, it will certainly be a military occupation. Will that continue indefinitely? Or for how long? Will the UN have a role and, if so, how substantial will it be? Will there actually be a transition to democracy? If so, when? This is not an easy place to turn over to someone else to take charge. There are Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. This is a lot like the Balkans, which were held together by Tito – only a tyrant held it together. Will Iraq be safe? What will be the future of the current Iraqi leadership? What happens with Saddam and his cronies?

We face a number of issues. This war isn't over yet, but many of the worst fears have not been realized. There has been no large number of casualties; there has been no use of weapons of mass destruction; and there has been no significant house-to-house fighting in Baghdad. So far, so good, militarily.

However, other costs have been high. Thus far, the war itself has cost about \$80 billion. That's UCLA's budget for 27 years. The occupation will be tough, so will reconstruction. There will be additional costs, including side payments we must pay to a number of other countries. We promised them aid in return for their support of the war.

We also will have to face diplomatic issues: how do we deal with the fact that, to many countries in the world, it appears that we acted unilaterally and in defiance of the UN? This image persists even though the UN was never brought to a vote over whether the United States should go into Iraq. We have a rift with two of our staunchest allies, France and Germany. There is

the danger of undermining the United Nations. These are all challenges that we are going to be starting to meet now.

In my mind, the biggest unknown and the biggest challenge is this: What will happen to the stability of the Middle East? Will we have democracy dominos, or will the dominos go the other way – will we see the collapse of moderate governments in Arab countries, replaced by political, religious governments? I don't know. We will have to wait and see.

Let me turn now to the war with North Korea, the war of speeches. What we are worried about there, again, are weapons of mass destruction. But this time, we are worried about nuclear weapons, the worst of the weapons of mass destruction. It is estimated that North Korea now has enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons. They conceivably could have already made them. They have plutonium in the fuel from their nuclear reactor – spent fuel, as we call it – that they could process, separate the plutonium, and use to make about six more nuclear weapons. That would take a few months. After that, they could produce about one weapon per year.

We had an "Agreed Framework" under which North Korea froze its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. "Froze" meant that they weren't operating the reactor; they weren't operating the processing facilities; they weren't producing plutonium; and they weren't separating plutonium. In return, what they got from us was a pledge of fuel oil – 500,000 tons per year – and a commitment that we would build two nuclear power plants designed so that they could be used to produce electricity but not bombs. And those power plants would each cost one or two billion dollars.

This agreement was never fully carried out for one political reason or another. North Korea essentially walked away from the Agreed Framework. Their precise words were, they "set aside" the Agreed Framework. And, more recently, they announced

that they are withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, the United Nations Security Council is meeting today to discuss North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is very significant. Until this action, there were only three countries in the world that were not signatories to the NPT: India, Israel, and Pakistan. Each of these nations refused to join the NPT because they intended to get nuclear weapons. And each of them did: India, Israel, and Pakistan. North Korea would be the first country to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea has thrown out their inspectors and closed down their surveillance equipment. All are out of North Korea now.

Now what is North Korea trying to do? Again, I begin by saying that I don't know. But regarding North Korea, I'm in good company. There are no experts on North Korea. Or if there are any, those experts are in North Korea. There are lots of specialists who claim to know something about North Korea, but when you get into a conversation with one of these "specialists," and they tell you what they actually know, it turns out that it's not much.

North Korea is a black box. It is even hard to learn about the nature of North Korean society. The North Korean regime has been paranoid for years. They always have been worried, and seem to be genuinely worried, about an attack from the United States in conjunction with South Korea. It didn't help that they were assigned to the "Axis of Evil." They were given early membership in this exclusive club. North Korea sees that we went into Iraq with the rationale of regime change. This doesn't sound too good if you are running North Korea. And then the United States announces an important change in its national security policy, which is extending the doctrine of preemption. In other words, we don't have to wait until there are forces and weapons on the other side that pose a clear and imminent

danger to us. We can attack before these weapons exist, because we believe that the other country is trying to assemble them. If you look at any of this from the point of view of North Korea, it doesn't look good.

North Korea might be pursuing its nuclear program as part of a negotiating game; it could be a bargaining chip. They see that we are involved with fighting both terrorism and Iraq. We are not going to want to get involved in a war with North Korea, as well. They could see this as an opportunity to strike a better deal than the Agreed Framework of 1994.

So what are our options? What can we do here? It's not easy. There are other countries that care a great deal about these issues, including Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The United Nations also is engaged. But we don't know much about what is going on in North Korea. We don't know very much about North Korea's capabilities, although we have some good estimates. We know very little about North Korea's intentions. There is a fact that we do know: Seoul, South Korea, is only about 30 miles from North Korea. It can be reached by artillery and by short-range missiles. Enormous damage could be done to Seoul by North Korea. And, parts of Japan are also within range of North Korean missiles.

We might say, why not just preempt and destroy North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities? Let's not talk about hawks vs. doves, or morality vs. immorality. Let's talk about hard choices. Are we positive that we know where all of their nuclear weapons are? What if we try to preempt and they are left with three nuclear weapons? So, once again, it appears that diplomacy is the least bad option. That is why this is a war of speeches. And in the UN today, there are speeches.

What's a plausible outcome? North Korea could accept a deal in which they refreeze the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon; account for all of the plutonium or highly enriched uranium

from which they could make nuclear weapons; accept nationwide inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for nuclear facilities; and remove the spent nuclear fuel that has plutonium in it.

In return, what do the United States and Japan and South Korea have to do? They would have to keep their part of the deal on the fuel oil and the nuclear power plants; perhaps offer a nonaggression pledge, just in case North Korea really believes there could be an attack; and, this is more difficult, improve diplomatic ties with North Korea.

The biggest danger here is of a proliferation cascade. What will it mean for the Non-Proliferation Treaty if countries start to withdraw from the pact because they feel a need to acquire nuclear weapons? It could be a distraction from our war on terrorism and our occupation, liberation, and rebuilding of Iraq. Again, the costs are financial and diplomatic. There are certainly risks to South Korea and Japan. And I'll just mention in passing that national missile defense does not solve any of these problems. There may be some problem somewhere that it solves, but not this one.

Now the final war, the war with Iran, the war of silence.

First, a little bit about Iran's nuclear history that seems to have been forgotten in the press. In the early 1970s, Iran, then run by the Shah, acquired its first nuclear reactor. It was supplied by the United States. It was under international safeguards, and inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Within the next few years, the Shah completed contracts to assure that there would be nuclear fuel for that reactor. Those contracts were signed with the United States, Germany, and France. When the Shah fell in 1979, Iran had contracts with Western countries to provide six large nuclear power plants, and two of these plants were more than halfway completed by that time. But, of course, with the fall of the Shah, Western assistance came to a halt.

What is the situation today? U.S. officials maintain that in Iran there is under construction a uranium enrichment facility that could be used to produce fuel for power plants, but could also be used to produce highly enriched uranium for use in bombs. Intelligence estimates are that it could start to operate in about 2005 and could produce enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs per year, if that's what it's used for. The Russians are assisting Iran in building a nuclear power plant, in a different place. And Iran has refused to pledge that it will not have uranium-enrichment facilities or plutonium-processing facilities for making materials from which bombs could be made – materials that also could be used for nuclear power.

There are suspicious activities, but there is no hard evidence that Iran is violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. What is Iran trying to do? The answer again is: I don't know, but the Iranians might actually feel a need for nuclear weapons. They live in a pretty tough neighborhood, adjacent to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. They are within range of missiles from Russia, China, and India, just to mention the local nuclear powers. They may feel insecure.

Iranians may feel isolated. Ever since the hostage trauma of 1980, they have certainly been isolated from the United States and from much, but not all, of the West. And, once again, being awarded membership in the "Axis of Evil" may have them thinking about things differently. Or they may have just a nuclear power program. All of these things are possible.

What are our options? There are no easy ones. We have no formal relations with Iran. That makes it difficult to conduct diplomatic talks. Russia and the European Union have extensive economic ties in Iran. In fact, the European Union is Iran's leading trading partner. We could try a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear complex, but we had better know where everything is located. And it would be rather embarrassing if we

preempted and destroyed what was a perfectly legitimate civilian facility. By and large, the U.S. government has reacted to the situation by ignoring it. That is why this is the war of silence.

Diplomacy is worth a try. To go this way we would have to support and strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are other arms control agreements that we have to be willing to support and strengthen, like the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. We would have to recognize and reward countries that are in complete compliance with the NPT. And we would have to reduce our rhetoric. Inciting rhetoric increases nations' incentives to acquire nuclear weapons because they are worried about what we might do.

With regard to Iran, we are worried, again, about a proliferation cascade, and about a distraction from the war with terrorists and in Iraq. And we have to ask ourselves whether we are ready for formal relations with Iran.

I've now discussed the four wars. Let me just make a few final remarks in summation.

First of all, you may have noticed that I have focused on weapons of mass destruction as opposed to other kinds of bad things that people could do to us. That is because I want to focus on our most vital of interests, that is, our survival. It is important for us to keep our eye on that ball, not only in regard to these four wars, but also in regard to the thousands of nuclear weapons that are still in Russia. We need to make sure that these weapons don't get into the wrong hands.

We want to preserve and strengthen the nonproliferation regime because weapons of mass destruction are so important. The nonproliferation regime has been remarkably successful, whether because of hard work, good luck, God's will – I don't know – but it has been remarkably successful. The number of countries that have nuclear weapons today compared to 25 years

ago is either the same or is only one more. This has been a remarkably successful regime. Let's keep it that way.

Second, we have to recognize that there has been a revolution in U.S. national security, but the revolution is a little different than a lot of people think. The revolution is that we are clearly and unambiguously the world's only superpower: militarily and economically. We will spend on defense this year more than the defense budgets of all the other countries in the world put together. That's because of the added expense of the war in Iraq. Without the war, we would be spending more than the next 25 countries in the world. We are the sole superpower economically as well. As bad as our economy is, it is bigger and better than anybody else's. The United States is so powerful that we can do almost anything, but we can't do everything. In deciding what to do, we must take into account not only our capabilities but our interests and our values as well. That is what has to guide us. We are less limited by our capabilities than we have been in the past.

The people in this room are quite varied in age. How many people remember the comic strip "Pogo"? Very few. Let me say a couple of words about Pogo. The comic strip was written by Walt Kelly, and one of his most famous strips appeared on his birthday in 1971. In this strip, Pogo is concerned about the environment and he is staring out at the swamp in which he lives. It is littered with tires and old refrigerators and garbage and other junk. And Pogo says, "We have met the enemy, and he is us." He was talking about protecting the global environment.

Well, in this case, when we look at what we should do next, to paraphrase Pogo, we have met the experts and they are us. This world is very different than the world in which I grew up and came to be an expert on national security. It is very different than the world in which Donald Rumsfeld grew up and became

an expert on national security, or Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, any of us. The world is very different and we are doing our best to adapt. But our best source of ideas for better policies is an informed and educated citizenry. That's where the new ideas are going to come from. To the students in this room, especially, I say, we're counting on you.

